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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In recent years, financial market integration
has become a topical issue on the European
agenda. Moreover, the importance of the
institutional framework for the functioning
of financial markets has generally been
acknowledged. With a view to benefiting from
the experiences of other countries, this paper
takes a closer look at the institutional set-up of
financial markets in the United States of
America and investigates whether the US can
serve as a model for the EU. For the purpose
of this analysis, the institutional framework
is defined as the organisational entities,
procedures and practices of financial
regulation and supervision, including issues
such as competences and the distribution of
powers.
The overall conclusion is that the US
institutional set-up as a whole does not seem
to be a suitable benchmark for the EU as it
is the outcome of specific historical, political
and economic circumstances, which differ
substantially from those in the EU.
Nevertheless, there are features which could
provide inspiration for further debate on the EU
institutional framework, such as the prominent
role of federal regulatory agencies (including
the central bank and its role as “umbrella
supervisor” over financial holding companies),
the capacity of the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC) as a federal institution to
remove barriers to cross-border activities, and
the elements of choice for the supervised
entities in the regulatory system, which allow
for some regulatory competition.
In analysing the US regulatory system and
assessing it against the background of the EU
setting, the following key messages emerge.
First, in the US, the level for the substantive
regulation – federal or state level – as well as
the “institutional density” is different for the
various segments of the financial market.
While banking and, in particular, the securities
market are dominated by federal legislation
and institutions, the regulation and supervision
of the insurance business is left to individual
states. By contrast, financial market legislation
for all sectors is an integral part of the internal
market competence of the European Union.
Moreover, at the EU level, the Lamfalussy
framework provides for procedures and
institutional structures that are basically the
same for banking, securities and insurance.
Second, the complex regulatory/supervisory
structure in the US involves a number of federal
regulatory agencies1 alongside an estimated
100 state supervisory bodies which are
responsible for the supervision of financial
institutions and markets in the fifty states. The
federal agencies are the outcome of a specific
historical development of constitution/nation
building (e.g. the Civil War) as well as the
reaction by policy makers to profound
economic shocks and crises (e.g. the Great
Depression). The setting-up of these
institutions implied a growing regulatory role
for the federal level while the state agencies
remained in place. This federal institution-
building happened “top-down”, with the states
playing virtually no role in the process, as
federal law in the US can be developed without
the consent of the states. By contrast, there are
no comparable federal regulatory agencies at
European Union level. Instead, there is a
framework for collective decision-making that
builds upon the co-operation of Member States.
This set-up is the result of the prior existence of
strong nation states and the fact that the EU is
not a federal state like the US. While this
structure is probably the main factor that makes
the EU level appear rather weak compared to
the federal power in the US, it corresponds to
the EU being a polity sui generis, where in
many respects the Member States, as “masters
of the Treaties”, continue to play a dominant
role.
1 e.g. the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC),
the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS),
the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).5
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Third, the US federal agencies generally have
great discretion in delivering policy
encompassing legislative/regulatory,
executive/supervisory and even judicial
functions. This is a marked difference to the
EU, where these functions are separated, with
the EU level being competent for financial
market legislation, and individual Member
States – besides their participation in the rule-
making process at EU level – having exclusive
authority for implementation/supervision.
Although under the Lamfalussy framework co-
operation between the legislative/regulatory
level and the executive/implementing level has
been gaining momentum in the EU, it cannot
match the integration of regulation and
supervision that exists within the US federal
agencies. However, while the US structures
favour uniform implementation in the entities
supervised by a particular regulatory agency,
the high number of US regulatory agencies at
the federal level makes the adoption of uniform
rules across the same type of business (e.g.
banking) a time-consuming and cumbersome
process. If Congress, however, has a clear view
on what it wants to achieve, it can threaten to
legislate directly and thus speed up action by
regulatory authorities. In the EU, the
participation of Member States in rule-making
risks slowing down the regulatory process as it
requires compromise and often leads to the
lowest common denominator. The Lamfalussy
process tries to tackle this, among other things,
by aiming at a clearer distinction between
framework legislation to be decided at the
political level and more technical rule-making
by the so-called level II committees.
Fourth, the US system provides scope for
“active” regulatory competition. In US
banking, for example, both federal and state
supervisors strive to offer high-quality
supervision at a reasonable cost because banks
may switch from a state to a “national” (i.e.
federal) charter and vice versa. This element of
choice does not exist in the EU. There is neither
the possibility to switch to an “EU charter” and
concomitant EU supervision (analogous to the
national charter and OCC-supervision), nor the
opportunity to decide upon “membership” in an
NCB of the Eurosystem (analogous to
membership in a Federal Reserve Bank), and
thereby also making a decision on the
regulator/supervisor at the “federal” level.
Regulatory competition in the US is, however,
constrained by federal law, which ultimately
determines the leeway of regulatory agencies
and state regulators. This can even be seen in an
area such as insurance, where at present the
federal level does not legislate. Under the
threat of the introduction of federal regulation
or of an optional federal insurance charter, US
state insurance commissioners strive to co-
operate effectively in order to allow smooth
cross-border insurance activity.
With regard to the EU, it should be noted that, if
properly applied, minimum harmonisation and
mutual recognition provide room for regulatory
competition among Member States, which may
be induced by the mobility of financial
intermediaries to transfer their headquarters
from one Member State to another. This kind of
“passive” regulatory competition can be
regarded as a potential force for achieving a
level playing field on the financial market.2 The
mutual recognition principle would, however,
have to be applied in a much broader way than
today. Currently, Member States still tend to
protect intermediaries under their jurisdiction
by imposing host country rules on
intermediaries from other Member States.3
Fifth, the predominance of the federal level in
the US system implies that barriers to cross-
border business arising from state law may
be easier to overcome than in the EU. While
in US banking, the laws of the host state
regarding community reinvestment4, consumer
protection, fair lending and the establishment
2 The new legal framework for the cross-border transfer of
registered offices currently under preparation in the
European Commission must be seen in this context.
3 In the consumer protection area, for example, Member
States generally invoke the so-called “general good clause”
to justify the continued application of host country rules.
4 The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 is intended to
encourage banks to extend credit to low and moderate-
income neighbourhoods.6
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of  intrastate branches generally apply to
interstate branches, the OCC may pre-empt the
application of such state law to branches of
national banks. In the EU, while there is the
principle of primacy of EU law over national
law, harmonised rules are not always
implemented in a uniform fashion.
Furthermore, as pointed out above, mutual
recognition does not work in a satisfactory
way.
Sixth, both in the US and in the EU, the
multitude of regulators/supervisors puts a
premium on co-operation. In the US, for the
banking sector, the co-operation has been
institutionalised at the federal level in the
Federal Financial Institutions Examinations
Council (FFIEC), established in 1979, and at
the state level in the Conference of State Bank
Supervisors (CSBS), which was founded as
long ago as 1902.5 The activities of the FFIEC
and the CSBS concern, inter alia, the
development of common reporting forms,
the common training of officials or the
accreditation of supervision programs.
Furthermore, the CSBS played a decisive role
in providing a basis for co-operative efforts
among the state supervisors and as the natural
interlocutor for discussion on supervisory
agreements with federal agencies in view of
liberalisation of interstate branching in the
mid-nineties. As for the EU, the institutional
co-operation among regulators/supervisors has
gathered momentum with the introduction of
the euro, increasing financial integration and
the establishment of the Lamfalussy
framework.
Seventh, the US experience shows how
difficult it is to fundamentally change
institutional set-ups. So far, such moves only
happened under conditions of deep political
transformation and/or major economic shocks.
Once institutions have been set up, substantial
inertia develops, making reform a daunting
task. For example, recurrent efforts to
streamline the banking supervisory system in
the US have failed. The need for reform to
remedy supposed or actual overlaps and
regulatory conflicts by creating a single federal
banking agency has not been convincing for
Congress given the risks of changing the
established structural features of the US
financial system (dual banking system,
regulatory role of the Fed) that such reforms
would imply. While, so far, it has proved
impossible to streamline the structure of
supervision in the banking sector, the US has
found a specific answer to an increasingly
liberalised and de-specialised financial market
by making the Federal Reserve responsible for
umbrella supervision. Thus, incremental
reform is feasible, while leaving the basic
institutional structures intact and avoiding
wide-ranging institutional overhaul.
Assuming a “path dependence” of institutional
developments, a major shake-up of
institutional structures in the EU or the
delegation of regulatory competence to an EU
regulatory agency would only occur in case of
extraordinarily strong political or economic
pressure. The European model of integration
is, however, specifically characterised by
incremental steps towards deeper integration.
With the Lamfalussy process, the EU has
provided itself with a framework that has
the potential to foster viable European
institutional structures for regulation and
supervision. Consequently, a successful
implementation of the Lamfalussy process that
leads to better rule-making, and is supported by
transparency, consultation and effective
implementation through supervisory co-
operation, would make sweeping institutional
reform less likely. In the context of the
Constitutional Treaty, the European Union
level, while continuing to lack a substantial
executive role in financial services might
further strengthen its legislative role, since the
Commission will be empowered to pass
“delegated European regulations”. In this
regard, the EU framework may become even
5 In insurance, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) was founded even earlier, in 1871,
to address the need to coordinate regulation of multi-state
insurers. Co-operation among securities regulators takes
place within the North American Securities Administrators
Association (NASAA), founded in 1919.7
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more streamlined than that of the US as the
regulatory function would be concentrated in a
single entity. However, if the current EU
approach does not meet expectations, new
models might need to be devised.8
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1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
In recent years, financial market integration
has become a topical issue on the European
agenda. Moreover, the importance of the
institutional framework for the functioning of
financial markets has generally been
acknowledged. With a view to benefiting from
the experiences of other countries, this paper
takes a closer look at the institutional set-up of
financial markets in the United States of
America and investigates whether the US can
serve as a model for the EU. For the purpose
of this analysis, the institutional framework
is defined as the organisational entities,
procedures and practices of financial
regulation and supervision6, including issues
such as competences and the distribution of
powers.
This paper describes how the regulatory
agencies came into being, what their nature is
and how they relate to each other. A particular
focus is on supervisory co-operation in US
banking, against the background of banking
deregulation in the second half of the 1990s, as
well as efforts to consolidate the supervisory
structure. Furthermore, light is shed on rule-
making by regulatory agencies, with a
particular emphasis on aspects of speed and
flexibility. Regulatory competition and crises
are identified as the main driving forces behind
financial legislation and rule-making.
References to the EU situation are made
whenever appropriate. This paper does not,
however, intend to provide a detailed
description of the EU regulatory system.
Throughout, the terms “federal/state level” are
used for the US and “European Union (EU)/
Member State (MS) level” for the EU to depict
the two main levels of governance.
2 INSTITUTION-BUILDING: THE
REGULATORY AGENCIES
The institutional regime of the US financial
system is characterised by a high institutional
density, with both federal and state authorities
responsible for financial sector regulation/
supervision. The Courts and the rule-making
powers of Self Regulatory Organisations
(SROs) such as the New York Stock Exchange
also play an important role. There are,
however, important differences between the
regulatory and institutional framework for
banking, insurance and the securities business.
As regards the regulation/supervision of the US
banking system, on the federal level, there are
four banking regulators, namely the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency/OCC
(responsible for “national banks”), the Federal
Reserve Board/FRB (responsible for state
member banks, i.e. state banks that are
members of one of the 12 Federal Reserve
Banks, and acting as “umbrella supervisor”
of bank/financial holding companies), the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation/FDIC
(responsible for state banks that are not
members of one of the Federal Reserve
Banks) and the Office of Thrift Supervision/
OTS (responsible for savings institutions)7/8.
At the state level, fifty state banking agencies
are responsible for the award of charters to
those opting for state charter and state
6 Although it is understood that there is a conceptual
difference between regulation and supervision, in the
context of the description/analysis of the US system, the two
terms will be used interchangeably in line with US
terminology.
7 The OTS is the successor to the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, which was dissolved after the S&L-disaster. The OTS
was established by Congress in 1989, as the primary Federal
regulator of all Federal and state-chartered savings
institutions across the nation that belong to the Savings
Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) (which is under the
control of the FDIC). The OTS headquarters are in
Washington, D.C., but OTS staff – all in all about 900 –
works out of local offices organised into five regions and
examines and supervises savings institutions throughout the
country. Its functions include issuing federal charters for
savings and loan associations and savings banks; adopting
and enforcing regulations to ensure that both federal and
state-chartered thrift institutions operate in a safe and sound
manner.
8 For the sake of completeness one should also include the
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), which
supervises about 9,000 federal and state credit unions. Their
total assets are about USD 600 billion, compared to USD
7,600 billion for the commercial banks and USD 1,200
billion for the thrifts. The NCUA was established in 1970 as
the successor of the Bureau of Federal Credit Unions (set up
in 1934).9
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supervision.9 (See Annex I on the structure of
banking regulation in the US).
At present, insurance regulation/supervision
is exclusively done at the state level10 with
state insurance commissioners having direct
regulatory authority. While there is no federal
insurance agency, the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) serves as the
forum in which state commissioners co-operate
to develop common policies where needed.11
By contrast, regulation of the securities business
is almost exclusively done at the federal level
and under the supervision of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). Trading in equity
and debt markets is supervised by the SEC12,
while the supervision of commodities and
financial derivatives markets falls under the
competence of the CFTC. State securities
regulators basically restrict themselves to acting
as service organisations (e.g. for dealing with
complaints) to the investors who are resident in
their state.
All in all, there are at least 110 financial
regulatory authorities in the US, the bulk of
which are state authorities.13
Given the number of actors involved as well as
the varying competences at state and federal
level, the current institutional framework
governing the regulation and supervision of
financial markets in the US is quite complex.
It is the outcome of a specific historical
developments in constitution/nation building, as
well as the reaction by policy makers to profound
economic shocks (e.g. the Great Depression,
corporate scandals).14 While the political
institutions – Congress, Government, the
Supreme Court – were set up shortly after the
Revolutionary war under the US Constitution
(1789), the federal monetary and financial
agencies were only developed at a later stage, but
again as a result of deep political and/or
economic shocks: the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC) in the 1860s following the
Civil War and a chaotic currency system, the
Federal Reserve System (Fed) in 1913 after
financial panics and bank failures, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in
1933/1934 in the wake of the Great Depression.
The creation of these institutions also entailed a
strengthening of central government, i.e. a
growing fiscal and regulatory role for the
federation.15
9 Unlike the banking supervisory framework, which is based
on a distribution of responsibilities to the federal and the
state level, the authority to approve mergers and acquisitions
of banking firms is assigned to the federal level. Depending
on the transaction, the federal supervisory authority
competent to rule on a merger or acquisition can be the:
(i) the OCC; (ii) the Federal Reserve Board; (iii) the FDIC;
or (iv) the OTS. The federal agencies which are in charge of
anti-trust policies for the corporate sector, i.e. the Federal
Trade Commission and the Department of Justice as well as
the other banking supervisory authorities must be consulted
before a decision is made.
10 When insurance companies operate under a Financial
Holding Company (FCH), the “umbrella supervisor”, i.e. the
Fed, can, however, exert some influence over their prudential
supervision.
11 The NAIC was founded in 1871 to address the need to
coordinate regulation of multi-state insurers. It describes
itself as a “multi-dimensional, regulatory support
organization.” State insurance commissioners have
consistently rejected ideas for federal pre-emption or an
optional federal charter, such as in banking.
12 The setting up of the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB) under the authority of the SEC by the
Sarbanes-Oxley-Act of 2002 shows the increasing importance of
the federal level also in the area of corporate law and governance,
which traditionally has been under state competence.
13 According to the US Government Accountability Office
(GAO), in July 2004, 23 states supervised banking and either
insurance or securities in one agency. Fourteen states
combined banking, insurance and securities regulation/
supervision in a single agency. See GAO (2004), p. 72. The
estimate for the total number of US regulatory agencies does
not take into account the separate thrift and credit union
supervisors in some states.
14 Calomiris (2000), p. xviii, referring to US banking
regulations states that: “The history of US banking
regulation repeatedly demonstrates the importance of
transient events (economic ‘shocks’) for influencing long-
term institutional history. That phenomenon – sometimes
referred to as ‘path dependence’ – leads one to take an
historical view of the evolution of regulation, that is, one
that recognises that the specific economic history of a
country matters. The long-run importance of shocks makes
institutional change less predictable and less responsive to
small changes in economic interests.” See also Bebchuk/Roe
(1999), pp. 127 - 170.
15 As Donahue and Pollak (2002), p. 85, put it “… the Civil War
and reconstruction saw a marked shift of authority away
from the states and toward the federal government.
Prosecuting the war itself accelerated the growth of
Washington’s power …” and with regard to Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s New Deal: “An unprecedented degree of
governmental activism on the economy, orchestrated from
the centre, meant an unprecedented concentration of
authority.”10
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Interestingly, the US Constitution provides no
explicit basis for the regulatory agencies,
which nowadays figure so prominently in the
US financial sector. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court – taking account of a rapidly changing
economic and social environment – has
allowed delegation of regulatory powers to
independent agencies by acts of Congress
under the condition that the legislature lays
down “intelligible principles” with which the
delegated body must comply when exercising
discretionary power. The so-called “non-
delegation doctrine”, which claimed that
Congress may under no circumstances sub-
delegate its legislative prerogatives conferred
to it by the Constitution, has thus been
abandoned.
As for the European Union, the situation
presents itself very differently. While having
some important federal characteristics, the EU
is not a federation, and it is an open question
whether it will be one in the future. Moreover,
the integration process – albeit motivated by
the lessons of World War II – was not propelled
by the sort of deep and fundamental crises the
USA has experienced in its much longer
history. It is, therefore, not surprising that, in
the EU, integration has proceeded more
gradually, with Member States playing an
important role in the decision-making process
and EU structures being relatively “light”.
The institutional structure for financial
regulation and supervision at the EU level as
redesigned under the Lamfalussy framework
(see Annex II), has thus built on existing
structures in the Member States. Furthermore,
it has been established in a proactive
manner after a thorough discussion involving
national governments in the ECOFIN (and
in its preparatory bodies), the European
Commission, the European Parliament (EP)
and the ECB, eventually resulting in a much
clearer structure than that in the US, where
institutional development occurred in a
more haphazard way. (For a highly stylised
comparative presentation of regulatory
structures see Annex III).
In the EU, the creation of US-style regulatory
agencies has not been an option because the
prevailing consensus reflected in the so-called
“Meroni doctrine” has been and still is that
agencies with discretionary regulatory powers
need to be explicitly set up by the Treaty.
The Meroni doctrine was developed by the
European Court of Justice16 and implies that
EU institutions cannot delegate discretionary
regulatory powers which have been conferred
on them by the Treaty to outside bodies as
this would threaten the balance of powers
between the institutions.17 A sub-delegation
of regulatory powers exercised by any of
the Community institutions to an independent
agency would, therefore, require explicit
authorisation by the Treaty.
This is in line with current mainstream thinking
that the original source of legitimacy of EU
action lies with the Member States which, as
“masters of the Treaty”, must unanimously
agree on a delegation of competences.18 In this
way, the constitutions of the Member States
and their sovereign powers are effectively
preserved and protected. By contrast, in the
US, the source of legitimacy of the federation is
primarily derived from the citizens exercising
their sovereign power via their elected
representatives in the US Congress.19 In the
16 See Meroni e Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v. High
Authority. Cases 9 and 10/56. ECR 11-48, 53-86. ECJ 1958.
The High Authority was the precursor to the Commission
under the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty.
17 The delegation of powers to outside bodies is to be seen
distinctly from the delegation of implementing powers by
the Council to the Commission under the so-called
“comitology” upon which the Lamfalussy framework is
built. “Comitology” is explicitly authorised by the Treaty
(Art. 202).
18 However, the EU also has elements of a Union of citizens,
notably reflected in the direct election of the Member of the
EP and in the EP’s role as a co-legislator but also in Art. I-1
of the Constitutional Treaty on the Establishment of the
Union referring to “… the will of the citizens and States of
Europe to build a common future …. ”
19 The US Constitution as adopted by the Constitutional
Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 had to be ratified by 9 of
the 13 original states to enter into force. Any change to the
Constitution needs to be ratified by three fourths of the
states. In the EU, any change to the Treaty requires an
Intergovernmental Conference and ratification by all
Member States.11
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US, both legislative chambers, the House of
Representatives and the Senate, are directly
elected.20 The senators thus neither act on
behalf of their state government, nor of their
state legislature.21 When a law is about to be
passed by Congress or a rule is being adopted
by a regulatory agency, state governments,
during the rule-making process, from a legal
point of view, may present their interests like
any other interested external party.22 By
contrast, in the EU, Member States advance
their interests by directly participating in rule-
making both with regard to the broad
framework (Council acting in co-decision with
the EP) and the spelling out of the legislative
details (in the financial markets field via the
committees under the Lamfalussy framework
(see Annex II)). Furthermore, the European
Commission has to rely on the Member States
and their administrations to implement
legislation, while in the US the federal
regulatory power is backed by a sufficient
financial and administrative capacity to
directly implement rules and to supervise their
application.23
In the EU, although there are no US style
regulatory agencies, there are currently 16
agencies – none of them in the financial
services field24 – that were established from the
beginning of the 1970s with a view to fulfilling
specific tasks without, however, disposing of
regulatory powers.25 As the environment in
which the institutions operate has changed
from the time of the mid-1950s when the
Meroni-doctrine was established, some
observers argue that it is time to reconsider the
Meroni doctrine and to adapt it in a pragmatic
way26 thereby coming closer to the US practice
as it has developed over time.
If EU regulatory agencies were to be
established, they would have to be subject to
similar accountability mechanisms as those in
20 The population of each of the fifty states elects two senators.
Being elected for a longer term than the House members
(6 years vs. 2 years), senators are supposed to think/act with
a longer time horizon and to provide a filter to “to short-
term passions of public opinion”, which might have more
influence on the House of Representatives, see http://
usgovinfo.about.com (Why We Have a House and a Senate).
21 Even prior to the Seventeenth Amendment to the US
Constitution of 1913, when US senators were appointed by
the State legislatures, senators were less closely linked to
their respective State governments than are the members of
the EU Council or of the German Bundesrat. For example,
senators were not subject to recall by the State legislatures
that appointed them, did not have to develop a joint position
on behalf of their State, and were not officially members of
State governments when they came to Washington. See
Halberstam (2002), p. 237.
22 While in the US federal regulators have gained prominence
with more regulation on the federal level, in the EU –
besides the Commission – it is the Member States
regulators/supervisors that have increased their importance.
More generally, regulators from Member States have over
the recent decades learned to work together in a “new pattern
of regulatory federalism based on partnership and
networking”. This has even led to new and converging
regulatory structures on the MS level (see Majone (2002),
p. 254). Moreover, the regulatory dialogue taking place with
third countries implies representation on the EU-side by the
Commission and the chairpersons of the level III committees
(see Annex IV).
23 The four federal banking agencies alone employ altogether
about 12,000 staff (regulation, supervision and supporting
staff), while the European Commission employs 110 staff
that are responsible for the whole financial sector. So far, the
focus of the staff concerned with financial institutions and
markets in DG MARKT has been primarily to develop
proposals for binding and non-binding rules in the context of
the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) and to –
selectively – monitor implementation by Member States.
24 The ECB, by virtue of the Treaty, has regulatory powers in
the fields of monetary policy, statistics and payments
systems, and can be authorised by the Council to perform
“specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential
supervision of credit institutions and other financial
institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings.”
(Art. 105/6).
25 These tasks comprise monitoring of the environment (e.g.
the European Environment Agency), fostering co-operation
in terms of vocational training (e.g. European Centre for the
Development of Vocational Training), or authorising the
release of products into commercial circulation (e.g. the
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products).
It is noteworthy that with regard to some of the agencies
which were established more recently, some Commission
services wanted to provide them with discretionary
regulatory powers. The Commission’s Legal Service,
however, objected on grounds of the Meroni doctrine.
Arguably, the Legal Service later moved away somewhat
from its position by stating that agencies cannot exercise
“regulatory powers of general character”, allowing the
conclusion – a contrario – that these bodies can exercise
specific regulatory powers. See Yataganas (2001),
Afterword.
26 They point especially to changes such as deregulation in
important sectors of the common market, e.g.
telecommunications, electricity, which make independent
European regulators more necessary than ever, but also to
the increasing importance of the EP being the expression of
a Union of citizens complementing the Union of Member
States, which would make the traditional doctrine appear
less convincing. See Yataganas (2001) or Pelkmans/Casey
(2003), p. 19.12
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the US, where congressional oversight27,
administrative procedures prescribed by law28
and courts keep regulatory discretion in check.
To some extent, the regulatory action of the
Commission may be compared to that of the US
regulatory agencies. Reflecting the dominant
role of Member States in the EU, the
Commission’s regulatory action under the
Lamfalussy framework is kept in check
primarily by the Member States in the
regulatory committees (i.e. the level II
committees) and to a lesser extent by the EP.
Although under the Lamfalussy framework the
Commission has assumed obligations in terms
of consultation and transparency vis-à-vis the
EP and third parties, pursuant to the current
Treaty and comitology rules, the EP still only
has the right to be informed and to give its
opinion,29 but cannot call back a regulation
passed by the Commission.30/31
Below, some important US agencies dealing
with the regulation and supervision of financial
markets (the OCC, the Federal Reserve
System, the FDIC, and the SEC) will be briefly
described, touching upon their specific origins,
tasks and competences. Furthermore, given the
importance of the OCC in creating a unified
financial services market, a case study of a
recent rule-making by the OCC will be
presented.
3 REGULATORY AGENCIES: OCC, FED,
FDIC, SEC
THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY (OCC)32 AND THE DUAL BANKING
SYSTEM
The OCC is the oldest of the federal bank
regulatory agencies, established by the
National Currency Act of 1863 and
strengthened by the National Bank Act of 1864.
Based on legislation elaborated by the Lincoln
Administration, the OCC was designed as part
of a new banking system to be made up of many
separate, federally chartered and privately
27 Congressional oversight includes hearings in congressional
committees on a regular basis and powers to reject or to
change a specific agency rule, to change the remit of the
agency or, furthermore, to dismiss a head of agency in case
serious misconduct.
28 Before the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), in 1946, many US agencies paid little attention to
procedural matters. The New Deal trusted that technical and
scientific expertise would – by definition – exclude
regulatory discretion becoming a problem. Judicial review of
the evidence used in reaching a decision was even seen as a
serious threat to “the very virtue of specialized knowledge
which constitutes one of the chief justifications for the
establishment of [regulatory] commissions” (Fainsod M.
(1940), “Some Reflections on the Nature of the Regulatory
Process”, quoted in Majone (2002), p. 258). With the APA
and later legislation, such as the Freedom of Information Act
(1974) and the Government in the Sunshine Act (1976), a
uniform framework for the conduct of agency activities and
minimum standards of consultation and transparency were
laid down. They effectively codified techniques developed by
courts to limit the exercise of regulatory discretion, e.g.
disclosure for comment, clear statement of legislative intent,
and most importantly, giving reasons for their decisions. See
Majone (2002), p. 265.
29 In 2002, the Commission committed, however, to “take the
utmost account of the Parliament’s position” (see declaration
of President Prodi before the EP plenary on 5 February
2002). This commitment was preceded by a flexing of
muscles by the EP which implicitly threatened to block or to
delay legislation to be passed under co-decision. Moreover,
the securities Directives adopted under the Lamfalussy
framework contain a sunset clause, which means that the
delegation of implementing measures to the Commission will
expire after four years following their entry into force unless
renewed prior to the expiry date under the co-decision
procedure (see Inter-Institutional Monitoring Group – Third
Report Monitoring the Lamfalussy Process (2004), p. 8)
30 With the entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty, the EP,
like the Council, would have a call back right as regards
“delegated European regulations” passed by the Commission.
This would, however, be a two-edged sword, as technical rule-
making might be subject to a politicisation through lobbying
directed at the EP. In the US, the regulatory discretion of
agencies is probably less directly influenced by lobbying
and “political” consideration with the expertise and
independence of their officials acting as a filter.
31 The assessment that the accountability in the EU is relatively
weak compared to the US does not change when one
acknowledges the fact that the activities of level III
committees, i.e. the committees of supervisors, are
scrutinised during regular hearings in the EP. It is furthermore
recalled that the level III committees do not have regulatory
powers. Rather their activities are limited to giving advice to
the Commission and facilitating supervisory convergence.
32 The OCC is an autonomous bureau of the Treasury
Department and is headed by a single person – the so-called
Comptroller of the Currency, who is appointed by the
President for a five-year term and also serves as a director of
the FDIC. The OCC’s headquarters is in Washington D.C., it
has four District offices, plus a “Large Bank office” and a
“Mid-size/Credit Card Banks office”. Around 2,800
employees work for the OCC, the vast majority of whom are
bank examiners. The Treasury officials cannot involve
themselves in case-specific matters before the Comptroller
(such as examinations, enforcement proceedings etc).
Furthermore, it cannot block or delay OCC regulations. The
OCC funds itself from fees paid by national banks. See
Macey/Miller/Carnell (2001), p. 70.13
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owned banks – the so-called national banks –
that would be established throughout the
country. Wherever located, they would operate
under a uniform set of federal powers, under
federal standards of operation, and federally
mandated capitalisation, with a federal
supervisor – the OCC – exercising the
oversight function. The national bank system
was to provide the federal government with a
vital source of funds to finance inter alia the
Civil War. At the same time, the banknotes
issued by the banks with the Comptroller’s
approval were intended to be the first national
currency.33
Originally, national banks had been expected
to crowd out the existing state banks
completely, not least because the federal level
actively discriminated against them by taxing
banknote issuances by state banks. State banks,
however, survived as demand deposits were
becoming a much more important part of
banking compared to the power to issue
banknotes. In this way, the so-called dual
banking system consisting of state banks34 and
the national banks came into being, with the
OCC having authority over national banks35.
One of the defining characteristics of the dual
banking system is the OCC’s nationwide
jurisdiction over federally chartered banks.
The OCC’s right of pre-emption of state laws is
based on a Supreme Court’s decision
(M’Culloch v. Maryland, 1819) stating that
“states have no power, by taxation or
otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any
manner control” national bank’s ability to
exercise business activities authorised under
federal law. Whenever the OCC designates a
state regulation as a “significant interference”
with federal prerogatives, the Supreme Court
normally follows the OCC and upholds pre-
emption. The origins of pre-emption36 are well
described by Greve:
“Congress was clear-eyed about its
objectives: it wanted to create national
banks as instruments for a national economy
and currency. The events of that time gave
Congress a vivid sense of the states’
centrifugal tendencies (to put it gently). And
so Congress readily concluded that national
banks needed a total prohibition against
state regulation. A federal charter is not a
pre-emptive floor, above which states are
still permitted to regulate. Rather, it truly
excludes any state law that materially
affects the operation of national banks.”37
This does not mean, however, that federally
chartered institutions are not subject to state
laws. When there is no conflict between federal
law (e.g. the National Bank Act) and state law,
the latter is also applied. If there is a conflict,
the OCC may use its pre-emptive power. 38
An important basis for the OCC’s powers lies
furthermore in the Supreme Court’s decision39
according to which the “business of banking” is
not limited to the enumerated powers (of
banks) in the National Bank Act and the OCC
has discretion to authorise activities beyond
those specifically mentioned.
33 As such, the national bank system was part of a national
program of economic development, which can be traced
back to the so-called “American system” of mid-1800, which
constituted a “visionary program of national economic
development that included federal construction of interstate
turnpikes and canals, federal funding for other internal
improvements, … and a national bank”. See Comptroller of
the Currency (2003), p. 6.
34 About three out of four commercial banks currently operate
under a state charter. Nine of the top ten banks, however,
operate under a national charter (see Annex III).
35 In simple terms, the OCC charters, regulates and supervises.
It can, inter alia, revoke charters, remove bank officials or
impose fines. The OCC supervises approximately 2,100
institutions, i.e. approximately one quarter of all
commercial banks, among them the largest US-banks.
36 The term “pre-emption” is used in US legal language, inter
alia, with regard to the specific powers of the OCC, but also
in the general context of the relationship between the federal
and the state level.
37 See Greve (2003) p. 12.
38 The Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution says that the
“Constitution and the laws of the United States … shall be the
supreme law of the land … anything in the constitutions or
laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.” This
means that any federal law – even a regulation of a federal
agency – supersedes any conflicting state law. When
Congress is not clear about its will to pre-empt state law, it is
the Court’s task to look beyond the express language of
federal statutes. See http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/
projects/ftrials/conlaw/preemption.htm
39 Nations Bank of North Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.
Co., 513 US 251 (1995), quoted in Comptroller of the
Currency (2003), p. 14.14
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THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM40 AND
“UMBRELLA SUPERVISION”
In 1913, after recurrent banking crises, which
were exacerbated by the lack of an outside
source of reserves for the banking system
(which the OCC could not provide), Congress
passed the Federal Reserve Act. The Federal
Reserve Act instituted the Federal Reserve
System, headed by a Board of seven members.
To ease concerns regarding excessive
centralisation, Congress arranged for Federal
Reserve Banks to be established in twelve
districts.
For national banks, membership in the Federal
Reserve System was and is mandatory, while
for state banks it is optional. As the Federal
Reserve System was given the authority to
supervise and examine member banks, there
was an overlap with the OCC, which had
authority over the national banks. This was
settled in 1917, when it was agreed that the
OCC would supervise national banks, but
would also provide its reports to the Federal
Reserve, while the Federal Reserve would
supervise state  member banks. As a
consequence, the Fed today directly supervises
approximately 1,000 state banks out of roughly
8,000 (state and national) commercial banks
(see Annex I).41
In the wake of the Great Depression, more
powers were given to the Board within the
Federal Reserve System under the Banking Act
of 1935. The new legislation strengthened
the Board’s administrative responsibility for
Reserve Bank supervisory duties, and also
established the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) to decide upon open
market operations.42 At the same time, the US
Treasury Secretary and the Comptroller of the
Currency were removed from the Fed’s Board.
During the post-war period, the Federal
Reserve System was further strengthened, first
by the Bank Holding Company Act in 1956,
which placed the formation of multi-bank
holding companies and their acquisition of
banking and non-banking interests under the
control of the Federal Reserve,43 and later with
the Financial Services Modernization Act of
November 12 1999, the so-called Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA). The GLBA
repealed the parts of the Bank Holding
Company Act which separated commercial
banking from the insurance business, as well as
the parts of the Banking Act of 1933 that
separated commercial banking from the
securities business (also known as “Glass-
Steagall”). The new financial holding
companies were placed under the authority of
the Federal Reserve System which retained all
the power it had under the Bank Holding
Company Act.44 Consequently, for financial
holding companies, the Fed either reviews or
receives notification of their formation and
subsequent expansion plans, and is also
responsible for supervising the overall banking
structure. The Fed thus gains insight into the
operations of banks which are not directly
under its supervision. All in all, the Fed
supervises about 640 financial holding
companies, the fifty largest of which have total
consolidated assets of about USD 7,600
billion, well above the total assets of USD
5,500 billion of the fifty largest US commercial
banks taken together. (The primary supervisors
of the top 50 US banks are shown in Annex IV).
40 The Federal Reserve System consists of the Board of
Governors and the 12 Federal Reserve Banks. The Board of
Governors is located in Washington D.C. Its members are
nominated for 14 years (except for the Chairman whose term
is 4 years, renewable) and are independent. It has
approximately 1,900 employees (approximately 370 of
which are in supervision). While the Board determines bank
supervision policy, it generally delegates the task of
conducting the examinations to the 12 Reserve Banks
(altogether about 2,600 staff in supervision, 1,200 of which
are field examiners).
41 In terms of total assets, however, the Fed directly supervises
only some 10% of the commercial banking sector as two of
the largest US banks, JP Morgan Chase and HSBC, have
been changing their charter from a state to the national
charter.
42 See Spong (2000), pp. 21 and 24.
43 Non-banking interests had to be closely related to banking.
44 See Barth, Brumbaugh and Wilcox (2000). GLBA removed
the restrictions on affiliations between banks and securities
firms, but banks and securities firms each continue to be
prohibited from engaging directly in the other industry’s
core activities.15
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The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was designed to
establish a system of functional regulation45 by
allowing each entity in a financial holding
company to be regulated by its primary
supervisor at the state or federal level. In
exercising its function as “umbrella
supervisor”, the Federal Reserve Board must
rely primarily on the functional regulators to
supervise the individual affiliates.46 The GLBA
requires the Fed to use “to the fullest extent
possible” the reports and examinations of
(i) other supervisors, including appropriate
state and federal authorities, for banks and
thrifts, (ii) the SEC for registered securities
brokers, dealers, or investment advisers, and
(iii) state insurance commissioners for licensed
insurance companies. Although the Federal
Reserve may examine a financial subsidiary
only under certain conditions,47 it may well be
that the Fed uses its umbrella authority quite
extensively given its view of its own mission.
This encompasses responsibility for the
stability of financial markets as a whole and not
only of banks. It also includes crisis
management such as in the cases of Penn
Central (1970) or LTCM (1998). In theory, the
Fed’s role as umbrella supervisor may be
limited by the possibility of national banks
to diversify via subsidiaries into most
financial activities (although not insurance
underwriting, merchant banking or real estate)
thereby avoiding the use of a financial holding
company structure and, in turn, oversight
by the Fed.48 However, from a practical
perspective, it would be hard for all but the
smallest national banks to avoid creating
holding companies, since the holding company
is the preferred vehicle to access US stock and
bond markets.
Since the mid-1980s the Federal Reserve
Board, under the leadership of Chairman Alan
Greenspan has became one of the main driving
forces behind regulatory reform, giving banks
more freedom to act in a highly geographically
and functionally-restricted environment.
Under competitive pressures from both outside
and inside the US, the case for liberalising
banking regulation has become more and more
compelling. During this process, the Fed has
become an increasingly powerful regulator49 as
the arguments for having an umbrella
supervisor in an increasingly liberalised
financial market – both in functional and
geographical terms – have become ever more
convincing.
45 Functional regulation, which is a securities law concept that
hinges on the definition of the product to be supervised and
not on the definition of the institution concerned, was,
however, impossible to achieve as banking law rests
primarily on the definition of banking institution and the
combination of its activities (accepting deposits and making
loans) and not on the individual products a bank sells. Thus,
banking regulation by definition constitutes institutional
regulation. See Schooner (2002), pp 190f. The reference to
functional regulation was inspired by the objective to
streamline regulation and to avoid regulatory overlaps.
Given increasing product hybridisation, regulatory
specialisation and clear attribution of roles is, however,
difficult to achieve. See Garten (2002), p. 168.
46 See Spong (2000), p. 266.
47 These conditions are: Firstly, the subsidiary is believed to be
engaged in activities posing a material risk to affiliated
financial institutions; secondly, an examination is necessary
to assess risk management systems, or, thirdly, there is
reasonable cause to believe a subsidiary is not in compliance
with the Bank Holding Company Act or other laws enforced
by the Fed. The Fed may not set capital requirement for
functionally regulated subsidiaries that are already in
compliance with the capital standards of their primary
supervisor. Neither may the Fed require such subsidiaries to
assist affiliated depository institutions if that would
materially harm their own condition. See Spong (2000),
p. 48f.
48 See Garten (2002), p. 174.
49 As a bank regulator, the Federal Reserve establishes
standards designed to ensure the safe and sound operation
of financial institutions. These standards may take the
form of regulations, rules, policy guidelines, or
supervisory interpretations and may be established under
specific provisions of law “or under more general
legal authority”. See Federal Reserve-Website http://
www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/frspf5.pdf Supervision and
Regulation, p. 80. For some, the Fed has become “a probably
too powerful regulator”. They refer to a potential conflict
with its monetary policy role. Furthermore, they criticise the
power of the Fed to decide what a “financial activity” is,
thereby defining the scope of their supervisory authority.
See Calomiris (2002), p. 22.16
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THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION (FDIC)50: A COMPONENT OF THE
FEDERAL SAFETY NET
A further significant institutional change
concerning regulation and supervision was the
creation in 1933 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which also
formed part of the restrictive legislation passed
in response to the Great Depression. The
FDIC’s mission is to maintain public
confidence in the US financial system by
insuring deposits for up to USD 100,000,
identifying, monitoring and addressing risks to
the deposit insurance funds51, and limiting the
effect on the economy and the financial system
when an institution fails. Insurance is
mandatory for all Fed member banks, but open
to non-member banks upon approval by the
FDIC. The FDIC as a fully-fledged banking
regulator is empowered to examine all insured
banks. To exclude supervisory duplication with
the Federal Reserve and the OCC, supervision
by the FDIC has been largely confined to those
insured state banks that are not members of one
of the Federal Reserve Banks, the so called
“state non-member banks” (today numbering
approximately 5,300).52 The role of the FDIC is
important in the process of bank chartering at
state level. In fact, many states require state-
chartered banks to obtain FDIC insurance
before they begin to operate.53
In an effort to reduce moral hazard in the
aftermath of the Savings and Loan crisis in the
1980s, federal deposit insurance was radically
changed in 1991 with the enactment of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Incorporation
Improvement Act (FDICIA). Prior to the 1991
legislation, the fees on the insured banks
(“assessments”) that funded the FDIC were
subject to an upper limit, with the federal
government having to step in to prevent
depletion of the resources of the FDIC.54
Following the enactment of the FDICIA, the
risk of losses was placed on insured banks
rather than on the federal government. This was
achieved by authorising the FDIC to impose
special assessments on insured institutions and
to use the money to repay temporary bridging
loans made by the Treasury to the FDIC. The
granting of such Treasury loans is conditional
on the FDIC being in a position to demonstrate
that its income from assessments will be
sufficient to service and repay the loan.
The creation of the FDIC as part of the federal
safety net (together with the lender-of-last-
resort facilities by the Fed and its guarantee of
daylight overdraft for large-dollar inter-bank
transfers on Fedwire) meant that the federal
level assumed increasing responsibility for the
regulation and supervision of the banking
sector. Federal deposit insurance as such was
therefore instrumental for an intensification of
federal regulation and supervision over
banking. As Macey puts it,
“… the history of the dual banking system
since 1933 has been a steady relentless
march towards federal regulation of all
aspects of banking related to safety and
soundness. This, of course, means that there
has been a steady march towards federal pre-
emption in all important aspects of banking
regulation. These areas include the
regulation of minimum capital requirements
for banks, the regulation of reserve
requirements for deposits, and the allocation
50 The FDIC is an independent agency managed by five
directors, one of whom is the Comptroller of the Currency
and one is the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision.
The three others are appointed by the President subject to
approval by the Senate, one of them being appointed as the
Chairman for a period of 5 years (the other two directors are
appointed for a period of 6 years). The main office of the
FDIC is in Washington D.C. Moreover, it has six regional
supervisory offices and a number of field offices around the
country. It employs about 5,200 people. Like the Fed and the
OCC, the FDIC is a permanent member of the Basel
Committee.
51 A reform of the deposit insurance system is currently
pending in Congress. Among other things, it is proposed to
merge the insurance funds (for banks and thrifts) and to
increase insurance coverage.
52 Since 1983 the FDIC has participated in the examination of
certain problem banks not directly under its supervision. In
order to eliminate redundant examinations, the FDIC’s
current policy is to participate in the examination of banks
supervised by other agencies only when the examinations
represent a concurrent effort or are confined to special
circumstances; see Spong (2000), p. 56.
53 See Spong (2000), p. 150.
54 See Kaufman/Wallison (2001), p. 33.17
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of regulatory authority over the bank closure
decisions. All of these areas once were
subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of state
banking regulators, but federal law now
controls all of these issues.”55
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (SEC) 56: PRIMARY REGULATOR
OF US SECURITIES MARKETS
As part of the New Deal legislation, the SEC
was established under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. The main objectives of the SEC
are to ensure the integrity of the securities
market and to protect investors in line with the
provisions of the federal securities acts in
force. Its tasks include the disclosure of
financial information of publicly traded
companies and oversight over broker-dealer
firms, investment advisors, mutual funds and
self-regulatory organisations (SROs), which
include, inter alia, the stock exchanges and the
National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD). In this context, the SEC reviews and
approves proposals for new rules and for
changes to existing rules filed by the SROs. It
has enforcement authority against individuals
and companies who infringe the securities laws
(insider trading, accounting fraud or providing
false or misleading information).
The SEC is the primary regulator of the US
securities markets57 with the individual states
playing only a secondary role. While so-called
Blue Sky laws58 are still in force in individual
states, states have refrained from developing
their securities law as the federal level has
increasingly regulated this area and effectively
“occupied the field” of securities regulation.59
That said, it is worth mentioning the recent
action under New York State laws by NY
Attorney General Elliot Spitzer to fight
conflicts of interest arising out of investment
research undertaken by analysts at Wall Street
investment banks (see footnote 104).
The dominant role of the federal level and the
SEC in securities regulation, which features,
among other things, an extensive system for
SEC registration, disclosure and liability
(backed up by the mechanism of class action
lawsuits) has attracted both admiration and
criticism. Proponents of a strong role for the
SEC refer to the importance of liquidity,
product diversification and innovative capacity
of the US market to which the SEC has
contributed. Others point to the
monopolisation of securities regulation and
oversight and the resulting undesirable
consequences, such as undue bureaucracy
(leading to unnecessary disclosure
requirements) and excessive transaction costs
due to a favouring of investment banks and
traders over issuers.60/61 Critical remarks are
mostly made by academics, but less so by
politicians or the financial industry.
With the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley-Act
(SOA) the SEC was further strengthened. Parts
of corporate law that, until that time, had been
considered to be the exclusive regulatory
55 See Macey (2001), p. 102. While the formal decision on the
closure of a state bank continues to be taken by state
authorities, the FDIC has the authority to revoke the bank’s
deposit insurance, essentially forcing it to be closed down.
56 The SEC consists of five Commissioners, with one serving
as the Chairman, and all of whom being appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate for
staggered five year terms. The SEC has approximately 3,100
staff and has its headquarters in Washington D.C. It has 11
regional and district offices throughout the country.
57 The supervision of financial derivatives and commodities
markets falls under the competence of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
58 The term “Blue Sky laws” has its origins in the unrealistic
promises that sellers of securities made to investors.
59 See Jackson (2001), p. 7. State securities regulators are in
fact more like service organisations helping to protect the
interests of investors resident in their state. They are often
first to identify new investment scams and to bring
enforcement actions to remedy a wide variety of investment-
related problems. They co-operate within the North
American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA),
founded in 1919, whose membership extends beyond the
USA and consists of 66 state, provincial and territorial
securities administrators in the 50 states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, Canada, and Mexico.
60 As Macey (2001), p. 108 puts it: “In fact, there is some
evidence that the SEC has been captured by the trading
community, and is therefore unlikely to produce the
exchange rules that are best for investors.”
61 The critique notably is inspired by the example of successful
regulatory competition for corporate charters in the US. See
especially Romano (2002), but dissenting opinion comes
from Bebchuk/Ferrel (2001), p. 90 f., who claim that the lack
of a federal take-over law has led to state takeover
legislation favouring management over shareholders.18
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domain of the states, were then federalised.
Reacting to corporate scandals (e.g. Enron,
WorldCom), for the first time Congress
regulated such issues as the composition, role
and function of the board of directors of public
corporations. Among other things, the SOA
partially pre-empts state law governing the
appointment, removal, and compensation of
directors and officers. The SEC is now
empowered to remove officers and directors
from their positions on mere grounds of
“unfitness”. Moreover, the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), under the aegis of the SEC,
promulgates corporate governance listing
standards (e.g. on director independence)
which effectively supersede state corporate
law.62
One reason why the centralisation in US
securities and increasingly also in corporate
governance regulation has been accepted, is
that the SEC is regarded as an effective
regulator which spoke out in favour of
strengthened corporate governance rules long
before the passage of the SOA. Moreover,
given the risk of confusion and regulatory
overlap in regulatory competition, uniform
requirements coming from a single regulator
appear more attractive.
4 RULE-MAKING BY REGULATORY
AGENCIES: A CASE STUDY OF THE OCC
Federal regulatory agencies enjoy considerable
powers. The OCC’s power can be exemplified
by its 2004 rule-making on “anti-predatory
lending laws”, i.e. laws protecting weak
customers from abusive bank practices in the
sub-prime mortgage lending market. The OCC
declared relevant state laws not applicable to
national banks and prescribed anti-predatory
lending standards for national banks’ lending
activities. This move was met with considerable
opposition from state representatives
(governors, supervisors and attorneys general).
The speed and authority with which the OCC
has proceeded is remarkable. It started the
procedure on 5 August 2003 with the
publication of a notice of proposed rule-
making (NPRM), received 2,600 comments
from interested parties by the end of the
consultation period (6 October 2003) and took
a decision on 6 January 2004. The decision
was published in the Federal Register63 on
13 January 2004 and took effect on 12 February
2004, just over 6 months after the issuing of the
NPRM.
In its final rule, the OCC, in essence, declares
the applicability of state consumer protection
law relating to real estate lending as pre-
empted and justifies its action by referring to
the US Constitution, the National Bank Act
and the Supreme Court. In tandem with these
pre-emption provisions the OCC adopted
supplemental and by nature – uniform – anti-
predatory lending standards governing national
banks’ lending activities.
During the two-month consultation, the
comments supporting the OCC’s proposed rule
came from national banks and banking industry
trade groups. They pointed out that, in effect, a
national bank must often craft different
products or services for each state in which it
does business, or accept not to provide all of
 its products or services in one or more states.
The OCC rule would offer much-needed
clarification of when state law does or does not
apply. Without such clarity, the burden and
costs associated with the numerous state and
local laws might be a significant deterrent to
national banks’ willingness and ability to offer
certain products and services in certain
markets.
Among those who were against the OCC’s
proposed rule, real estate companies feared that
their own affiliated lending operations would
become disadvantaged because they would
continue to be subject to state law while
national banks and their operating subsidiaries
would no longer be bound by those same laws
62 See Bainbridge (2003), p. 29 f.
63 Federal Register/Vol. 69, No. 8/Tuesday, January 13 2004/
Rules and Regulations.19
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and rules. State officials64 and members of
Congress questioned the legal basis of the
proposal and argued that the OCC lacked the
authority to adopt it. These commentators,
exemplified by the attorneys general65,
specifically pointed out that “the OCC’s efforts
to deal with the very substantial problem of
predatory lending … fall short of the actions
taken by many states.” The attorneys general
also objected to the OCC proposal to extend
pre-emption rules to operating subsidiaries of
national banks. This would amount to
“federalizing state-chartered subsidiaries ...
effectively destroying the dual banking system
that is valued by both Congress and the States.”
“The States would be deprived of all authority
to regulate these state-chartered corporations,
which include mortgage companies that have
long been licensed by States.”
More generally, attorneys general criticised the
OCC’s analysis of pre-emption as “one-sided
and self-serving”. They criticised its
“aggressive advocacy role in favour of pre-
emption in the federal courts”. It is interesting
to note that the attorneys general acknowledge
that the OCC succeeds in persuading most of
the federal courts “to ratify its aggressively
expansive pre-emption policy”.
The concerns voiced by commentators were,
for the most part, not taken up in the final rule.
In the “Regulatory Analysis” part of its
published rule, the OCC pointed out that it had
fulfilled legal requirements (e.g. consultation
meetings with representatives from CSBS66)
and described the extent to which the concerns
expressed (extent of pre-emption, undermining
of the dual banking system, adequacy of
consumer protection) had been addressed. The
OCC basically reiterated that its position
conformed with federal law and judicial
precedent, that the final rule preserved the dual
banking system and, finally, that the OCC had
ample legal authority and resources to ensure
that consumers were adequately protected.
This case study illustrates that federal agencies
– sometimes with the support of federal courts
– push for harmonisation and uniformity
quickly and decisively.67 If Congress considers
that the OCC – or any other regulatory agency –
has exceeded its powers, it has, by virtue of the
Congressional Review Act of 1996, the power
to review and possibly reject major agency
rules within a period of 60 days.68 Only if a
motion of disapproval passes both the House
and the Senate, and is then signed by the
President, does the respective rule not come
into force and the agency is banned from
publishing a similar version of the rule at a later
date. So far, however, the Congressional
Review Act has never been successfully
invoked. Furthermore, if there were to be a
fundamental disagreement between Congress
and the OCC about the latter’s regulatory
64 State banking regulators, the Conference of State Bank
Supervisors (CSBS), the National Conference of State
Legislators, individual state legislators, the National
Association of Attorneys General and individual state
attorney generals (AGs).
65 Letter of the National Association of Attorneys General,
signed by all 50 AGs, to the OCC from October 6 2003. The
very active and visible role played by the state Attorneys
General can be explained by the non-involvement of states in
federal rule-making. Attorneys General, as elected officials,
forcefully defend the prerogatives of their respective state.
66 The so-called Federalism-order (Executive Order 13132)
requires federal agencies, including the OCC, to certify their
compliance with that Order whenever a proposed rule has
“substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship
between the national government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.” In the case of a regulation that has
Federalism implications and that pre-empts state law, the
Order imposes certain consultation requirements with state
and local officials, requires publication in the preamble of a
Federalism summary impact statement, and requires the
OCC to make available to the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) any written
communications submitted by state and local officials.
These requirements must be satisfied before the OCC
promulgates a final regulation.
67 Interestingly, Congress had earlier expressed its view that
state law would continue to apply to the interstate operations
of national banks, particularly in the area of consumer
protection. (See report of the House-Senate conference
committee on the Riegle-Neal Act, quoted in the Letter by
AGs of October 6 2004, p. 5.) Nevertheless, as already stated
above, the OCC had been given authorisation by federal law,
the National Bank Act, to pre-empt state laws, an authority
which was subsequently confirmed by decisions of the
Supreme Court. See report of the House-Senate conference
committee on the Riegle-Neal Act, quoted in the Letter by
AGs of October 6 2004, p. 5.
68 “Major” is defined as a rule that is estimated to have an
annual effect on costs for the economy of more than USD
100 million.20
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powers, Congress could simply change the
National Bank Act if deemed appropriate, or
leave the matter to the Supreme Court.
5 SPEED AND FLEXIBILITY IN RULE AND
LAW-MAKING
In order to make financial regulation more
responsive to changes in financial markets, the
EU has created the so-called Lamfalussy
framework. It differentiates between
framework legislation, established under the
co-decision procedure (i.e. involving both the
Council and the EP), and more detailed
technical rules, passed via the speedier
“comitology” procedure. While this approach
has the potential to increase the adaptability of
financial market regulation, it does not provide
for the flexibility and scope of action of US-
style regulatory agencies.
In the US, important pieces of financial
regulation such as the Basel II rules will be
adopted by the regulatory agencies alone. By
contrast, in the EU, the main body of the new
Capital Directive as well as most of the
technical details contained in the annexes will
be passed under the co-decision procedure.
Only subsequent changes to the annexes will be
dealt with under the potentially faster
comitology procedure. Moreover, while the EU
Capital Directive will require transposition
into national law by Member States, US rules
will apply directly. Finally, translation into the
different languages of the European Union can
cause a bottleneck in the rule-making process.
This inevitably puts the EU at a disadvantage in
terms of speed. In particular, a prolonged
legislative process may arise when the EP acts
as co-legislator. In this case, Members of the
European Parliament may be lobbied to file
numerous amendments. By contrast, US
regulatory agencies, while being subject to
oversight by Congress, do not need a formal
stamp of approval by Congress for the rules
they issue. Lobbying by interest groups is thus
“filtered”, taking place in a more indirect way
by convincing members of Congress to support
their cause in the context of the congressional
oversight function (e.g. in congressional
hearings with agency officials).
While the US-style agency structure
undeniably has its advantages, the
effectiveness of regulatory action in the US
may, at the same time, be hampered by the fact
that there are several federal regulators. When
uniformity is required and Congress has not
given a specific agency the lead authority to
deal with a certain issue,69 it may arise that the
regulators cannot reach an agreement with each
other. This risks slowing down the rule-making
process or even leading to regulatory
gridlock.70 During the congressional hearing on
the proposed – but finally rejected – Regulatory
Consolidation Act 199471, the then Comptroller
of the Currency, E. Ludwig, referred “… to the
long histories of independent action that have
hardened [the agencies’] resistance to
accommodate opposing points of view (…) In
those circumstances, debate among the
agencies can take on the aura of deliberations
among sovereign powers that have great
difficulty reaching consensus on almost any
issue within meaningful time frames.”72 The
risk of regulatory stalemate is particularly
present if Congress is not plain about its
objectives. If Congress, however, has a clear
view on what it wants to achieve, it can threaten
to legislate directly and thus speed up action by
regulatory authorities.
In the EU, the speed with which financial
legislation can be adapted to developments in
the financial markets depends on the extent of
delegation of technical adaptations to the level
II Lamfalussy committees by the EU legislators
and on the efficiency of the committees. The
preparedness of the political level (Council,
69 The Federal Reserve, for example, has exclusive authority to
write the “Truth-in-Lending” regulations.
70 Furthermore, the risk was pointed out that the US position in
international financial negotiations might be weakened by
the fragmented nature of the US system. See GAO (2004),
p. 18. According to some observers, co-operation among
agencies with regard to Basel II was not without friction.
71 See Chapter 8 below.
72 See Ludwig (1994), p. 149.21
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EP) to delegate crucially depends, in turn, on
the satisfaction with the way in which the
Commission exercises its regulatory role. If
market participants get the feeling that their
views are not adequately taken into account,
they may lobby governments and members of
parliament to keep as tight a grip on legislation
as possible with the consequence that technical
details are regulated on level I, which ideally
should be restricted to the broad framework.
Changes to the broad framework of financial
market legislation – as opposed to detailed
rule-making – may require a lot of time on both
sides of the Atlantic. This is particularly true
for institutional reform, which is much more
difficult in a multi-layered governance
structure, with many interest groups playing
their role (as in the US or the EU), than in a
system of centralised decision making like that
of the UK.73 In the US, attempts to reform the
US banking supervisory structure by creating a
single federal banking agency have been going
on at intervals over the last forty years. Most
recently, law makers again failed in 1994, not
least because banking profitability was high
and the public at large lacked interest in the
subject (see Chapter 8 below). Institutional
reform is particularly cumbersome in the EU if
a change to the Treaty becomes necessary. Any
change to the Treaty requires unanimity of all
EU governments in an intergovernmental
conference and subsequent ratification, which
is difficult to achieve in a union of 25 or even
more Member States. The risk of an
ossification of institutional structures at EU
level thus seems to be even higher than in the
US, where federal regulatory agencies have
been established and can be changed by acts of
Congress with simple majority, hence not
requiring a change in the US Constitution.
Generally, the seriousness of the problems
concerned plays a decisive role in the speed of
action: for Sarbanes-Oxley and the creation of
the Public Companies Auditing Oversight
Board (PCAOB), it took less than eight months
after the corporate scandals had surfaced74 for
Congress to pass the law. By contrast, the
passing of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act took
two decades, because pressure was subdued
and institutional conflict prevalent75. In the
EU, a clear program and the deadlines set by the
Financial Services Action Plan led to a rapid
adoption of important pieces of legislation,
including the legal framework underpinning
the Lamfalussy process, and accelerated the
adoption of legislative measures, such as the
European Company Statute, which has been
discussed for more than 30 years.
6 DRIVING FORCES AND ACTORS IN
FINANCIAL REGULATION
It has already been pointed out that, in the
US, crisis has been an important driving
force for the creation of new institutions (e.g.
OCC/Civil War, Federal Reserve/widespread
banking crisis, FDIC and SEC/Great
Depression, PCAOB/corporate scandals) or the
reform of existing ones (e.g. FDIC/banking and
S&L-crises)76 (“positive” integration). Crisis,
73 “The blockade of institutional reform in the US ... can best
be explained ... by the tendency of Congress for stalemate in
dealing with contested measures in the maze of committees
and sub-committees.” This can be contrasted to the creation
of the FSA in the British Westminster system with
its “unchecked centralisation of power”, see Busch (2002),
p. 13.
74 Enron collapsed in November 2001, Sarbanes-Oxley entered
into force on July 30 2002. Criticism was, however, raised
with regard to the quality of the substance of the Act.
75 “Congress has been working for 20 years to remove the
Depression-era barriers that separate banking, insurance and
securities,” Sen. Phil Gramm said during the Senate
proceedings in July 1999, “… and for the first time in 20
years, both houses of Congress have passed bills to do that.”
The fact that many interest groups were influencing the
outcome meant that a short and simple bill calling for the
repeal of the Glass-Steagall and the Bank Holding Company
Acts in 1999 did not come about. Kaufmann (2000), pp. 42 f.
describes the legislative process as follows: “ ... the driving
forces have been primarily vested interests, fighting each
other for gains in a mostly zero-sum game. The process has
been a lobbyist’s delight … Foremost of these is Citigroup,
which needs congressional approval to maintain and fully
integrate all the activities acquired in Citicorp’s earlier
merger of equals with Travellers Insurance. If not
legislatively permitted within five years, some of these
activities, particularly insurance underwriting, could not be
conducted by Citigroup or any of its affiliates.”
76 The reform of the FDIC was accompanied by the conversion
of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC) into the Savings Association Insurance Fund
(SAIF), which was placed under the control of the FDIC.22
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however, has not been the only force shaping
the financial framework. Competition is the
other force at work, including competition
among regulators that is induced by
technology, globalisation and structural
change. This has led to greater liberalisation of
markets (“negative” integration).
In the US, there is a clear link between the two
driving forces of competition and crisis and
the activities of policy-makers, i.e. state
authorities, federal regulatory agencies or
Congress. When adapting to or creating a more
competitive environment was the issue, the
states (e.g. when lifting branching restrictions)
or the federal regulatory agencies (e.g. the
Federal Reserve Board when gradually
dismantling Glass-Steagall) took the lead.
When reacting to deep crises – very often in a
restrictive way – it was Congress which took
the initiative, mostly because the public
expected its representatives in Congress to do
so.
In cases of “negative” integration, i.e.
liberalisation, Congress has to a considerable
extent only ratified ex post what had already
been granted by the states or regulatory
agencies. One explanation why states and
regulatory agencies were more proactive in
deregulating than Congress might lie in their
desire to increase their regulatory
constituency. The Fed is one, but not the only,
example of an agency fuelling regulatory
competition. In the context of the GLBA, the
Fed was identified as a big driver in connection
“with its ongoing turf battle with the
comptroller of the currency for regulatory
supremacy in banking.”77 For its part, the OCC
used inter alia its pre-emptive power to expand
what national banks are empowered to do.
Although regulatory competition as a driving
force played much less of a role for Congress in
the past78, global integration of markets and
competition with the EU could, however, make
Congress more responsive to new challenges
(as was already the case with the Sarbanes-
Oxley-Act).
In the EU, both the driving forces as well as the
actors in financial legislation/regulation are
different from those in the US. More than
regulatory competition among agencies or
among states or the need to react to crises, the
compelling force for financial market
regulation in the EU has been the desire to
foster integration so as to create a more
competitive European financial market place.79
With regard to the actors, the strong role of the
Member States in the European construction
stands out again. Although the European
Commission formally has the exclusive right of
initiative for financial regulation, it must take
into account the positions of Member States as
much as possible. In its initiatives in the
financial services field, the Commission is
informed by the views expressed in the
Financial Services Committee (FSC), which,
as a Council body, comprises high-level
representatives of the finance ministries of
Member States shaping opinions on strategic
questions of financial markets legislation.80 At
a more technical level, the Commission
receives advice from the competent
Lamfalussy committees comprising again
officials and experts from Member States.
Given the importance of Member States in the
decision-making process, lobbying efforts
regarding EU rules are not only directed at the
EP but also at Member States governments. By
contrast, in the US, lobbying by the well
77 See Kaufman (2000), p. 42f. More recently, in connection
with “Basel II” it was again primarily the Federal Reserve
Board who reacted to big banks’ concerns of increased
competitiveness on the international level.
78 “Critics had argued that the two congressional banking
committees preferred not to pass legislation, since the
perenniel prospect of a bill works wonders in fund raising.”
See Calomiris (2000), p. xxv. To be fair, difficulties of
Congress in passing financial regulation may result also
from the fact that other committees besides the banking
committees have a say in bills that encompass the securities
markets or insurance.
79 To achieve this, the concepts of minimum harmonisation and
mutual recognition were developed. However, due to the
absence of a “true mutual recognition culture” (see Lannoo/
Casey (2005), p. 25) the single financial market is still not a
reality in all financial market segments.
80 The Commission also nominates a member to the FSC. The
ECB and the Chairs of the relevant Community committees
of regulators have observer status.23
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organised financial services interest groups81
is concentrated on the federal level, i.e. on
Congress 82/83, both to influence law-making by
Congress and the way in which congressional
committees exercise oversight over the
regulatory agencies.
7 THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN REGULATORY
AGENCIES: CO-OPERATION AND
REGULATORY COMPETITION
Although US financial activity was liberalised
to a large extent both in geographical as well as
in functional terms during the 1990s, the
institutional set-up for regulation and
supervision remained largely unchanged.
However, as the multitude of regulators/
supervisors on the state and the federal level
places a premium on effective co-operation
among agencies84, various forms of co-
operation have developed over time.85
In banking supervision, co-operation has been
institutionalised at the federal level in the
Federal Financial Institutions Examinations
Council (FFIEC) and, long before at the state
level, in the Conference of State Bank
Supervisors (CSBS). The FFIEC was
established in 1979 as a formal interagency
body empowered to prescribe uniform
principles, standards, and report forms for the
federal examination of financial institutions
by the Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC,
the National Credit Union Administration
(NCUA)86, the OCC and the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) and to make
recommendations to promote uniformity in
the supervision of financial institutions. It
provides, inter alia, schools for examiners and
training seminars on risk management. While
the agencies represented in the FFIEC share
information and coordinate among themselves,
they maintain their independence. As a
result, while the FFIEC has achieved more
consistency in dealing with supervisory issues
and reporting forms, its recommendations
have not always been adopted uniformly.87
Furthermore, there is ad-hoc co-operation
among federal agencies dealing with specific
questions such as money laundering and
terrorist financing.
At the state level, the Conference of State Bank
Supervisors (CSBS), which was founded in
1902, serves as a coordinating body for
81 Among bank trade associations, the American Bankers
Association (ABA) is the oldest and largest. It views itself as
the voice of the entire commercial banking industry. The
Independent Community Bankers of America view
themselves as the true voice of small banks, and competes
with the ABA for those banks’ support. State banking
associations also play an important role in conveying the
views of bankers in each state (both state and national
banks) to the state and federal regulators/legislators. The
Financial Services Round Table encompasses top executives
of large, expansion-minded banks and non-bank financial
institutions. See Macey/Miller/Carnell (2001), p. 77f.
82 Kroszner/Stratman (1998), p. 1164 cite a study according to
which financial services’ political action committees
constitute the single largest group of contributors to
legislators, providing nearly 20 percent of total
contributions (see Makinson, L., “Open secrets: The
encyclopedia of congressional money and politics”,
Washington D.C., Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1992.) The
influence of academic experts and think tanks catering to a
particular political perspective is also a feature, which
seems to be more developed in the policymaking
environment of Washington than of Brussels. Clearly, the
academic community made an important intellectual
contribution to the introduction of prompt corrective action
in the FDICIA and to the dismantling of Glass-Steagall in
the GLBA. See Axarlis (2004), p. 15 and 18.
83 Lobbying in Brussels is targeted at the Commission that
drafts the initial proposals and, at a later stage, at the EP
acting as co-legislator with the Council.
84 Spong (2000), p. 50 succinctly describes the layers of
banking regulation/supervision in the US: “The presence of
both federal and state authorities has brought almost all
banks under the regulatory authority of more than one
agency. All banks fall under the supervision and regulation
of their chartering authority, at either the state or federal
level. If deposit insurance is obtained – as it virtually always
is – a bank is subject to certain statutes of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act and, in the case of state non-member
banks, to direct FDIC supervision. If a state bank becomes a
member of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Reserve
is its primary federal supervisor. Also formation of a bank
holding company or a financial holding company subjects
banks and banking organisations to an additional layer of
regulation and supervision at the parent company level.
Moreover, banking organisations may further be subject to
the oversight of insurance, securities or other regulators as
they take on non-banking activities.”
85 The need for effective co-operation and communication was
stressed recently by the US Government Accountability
Office especially with regard to systematic information
sharing across sectors. See GAO (2004), p. 104 and p. 109.
86 The NCUA is the independent federal agency that since 1970
charters and supervises federal credit unions. It is the
successor of the Bureau of Federal Credit Unions that was
established in 1934.
87 See Spong (2000), p. 58.24
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achieving supervisory convergence, but also as
a lobbying institute for state banking in
Washington. It regularly delivers comment
letters to the OCC in the context of notices of
proposed rule-making. Moreover, it provides a
forum for discussing issues of common interest
to all state regulators and assists states in
maintaining efficient agencies. Its membership
includes state supervisors as well as many state
banks.88
The CSBS played a decisive role in providing a
basis for co-operative efforts among the state
supervisors and as the natural interlocutor for
discussion on supervisory agreements with
federal agencies in the context of the
liberalisation of interstate branching in the
mid-nineties. In 1996, two key agreements
were concluded with the active involvement of
the CSBS: the Nationwide Co-operative
Agreement among state supervisory authorities
on 13 November 1996, and the State/Federal
Supervisory Agreement between state
supervisory authorities, the Federal Reserve
Board and the FDIC on 14 November 1996.89/90
Both agreements – as well as later agreements
concerning large complex banking
organisations and foreign banking
organisations (FBOs) – are inspired by the goal
of providing seamless, flexible and risk-
focused supervision, minimising regulatory
burden and fostering consistency and
coordination among the appropriate regulators.
The agreements are the outcome of efforts by
the state banking system to remain attractive to
its “regulatory constituency”. If, due to a lack
of coordination between state banks and their
88 The CSBS, addressing potential members via its homepage,
describes itself as “a member-driven organization that
brings regulators and bankers together for a common
purpose. Your bank’s support helps us deliver on our core
strategic functions: to educate, coordinate, advocate and
communicate for the advancement of the state banking
system.”
89 The State Federal Working Group (SFWG) worked out
concrete proposals for the State/Federal Agreement of 1996.
Given the need to co-operate more closely between the
federal and state level under conditions of liberalised bank
branching, the Group was established in October 1995 as an
ad hoc committee composed of state bank regulators and top
regulatory officials of the FDIC and the Federal Reserve.
90 The  Nationwide Coooperative Agreement sets out the
responsibilities of the home state supervisor and the host
state supervisors for multi-state banks. In concrete terms,
the home state supervisor is defined as the primary regulator
responsible for the supervision of its state-chartered banks
and its out-of-state branches. His tasks include the
examination of safety and soundness and compliance with
applicable laws and responsibility for coordination with the
host state supervisors and the appropriate federal bank
regulatory agency. The home state supervisor may request
the host state supervisor’s participation to examine safety
and soundness, trust and electronic data processing. He
should use host state examiners to examine the compliance
with host state laws regarding community reinvestment,
consumer protection and fair lending and rely on their
guidance in this respect. (The parties to the nation-wide
agreement “recognize, that host state supervisors have a
legitimate interest in monitoring the safety and soundness of
out-of-state banks that operate branches in their states and in
making sure those branches are operated in compliance with
host state law.”) The home state supervisor shall designate
the examiner-in-charge, who may also be an examiner
employed and selected by a federal bank regulatory agency.
The examiner in charge shall designate the examination
responsibilities of each examiner involved in the
examination. Unless otherwise expressly provided under
host state law, the home state supervisor shall have approval
authority over all applications from a multi-state bank.
The  State/Federal Supervisory Agreement outlines the
responsibilities of the responsible federal agency and the
home state supervisor. Both designate a primary contact
person for each multi-state bank. The contact persons will
coordinate the supervisory and examination responsibilities
of their respective agencies. In principle, safety and
soundness examinations will be conducted on a joint basis,
with a joint examination team issuing a single examination
report. (The agreement explains in footnotes that the joint
examinations are not intended to supersede existing
Alternate Examination Programs (“AEP”), which are
conducted by either the responsible federal agency or the
home supervisor, which will also issue the examination
report. It furthermore clarifies that joint examinations will
normally be used for the larger, more complex organisations,
while alternate examinations are generally reserved for
small organisations.) In exceptional circumstances, e.g.
when there is significant safety and soundness risk, the
responsible federal agency or the home state supervisor may
conduct independent or special examinations (giving prior
notice to the other regulator). In developing a
comprehensive supervisory plan, the primary contact
persons will consider the view of the local Federal Reserve
banks, the local FDIC regional offices and the host state
supervisors, as appropriate. The responsible federal agency
and the home state supervisor may agree to have one
examiner-in-charge (EIC) or may each assign a co-EIC
(which may coincide with the primary contact persons) to
manage the on-site, joint examination. Consistent with the
goal of “seamless supervision”, the agreement requires that
all aspects of the examination process are fully coordinated
and that duplication is avoided. The parties to the agreement
also resolve to coordinate fully the applications process
by promoting consistency in approach (e.g. developing
common forms and introducing concurrent processing
periods). What is clearly expressed is that the provisions of
the agreement do not supersede statutory or regulatory
obligations of a bank to provide specific information or to
file required reports with a federal or state supervisor.25
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federal supervisors (Fed, FDIC), supervision
becomes too burdensome for multi-state state
banks, they can opt to become a national bank.
This would neither be neither in the interest of
the state supervisor, nor of the Fed or the
FDIC.91
In an effort to facilitate cross-border banking
activities, state banking authorities use CSBS
as a means to achieve supervisory
convergence. In its public compendium,
“Profile of State Banking”, CSBS staff have
been creating transparency by surveying state
laws in relation to topics, such as branching,
non-bank-activities and so on. The “Profile” is
intended to encourage greater substantive
uniformity and to be a source for identifying
particular state laws that may raise issues for
multi-state providers.92 Furthermore, CSBS
provides added value to its supervisory
members, by accrediting individual state
supervisors for meeting CSBS standards for
bank examinations, which is used as a
“marketing argument” by state agencies.93
While banking regulation in the 1930s led to
stronger federalisation with the creation of the
FDIC and a strengthening of the Fed94, state
banking authorities nowadays regard the FDIC
and especially the Fed as valuable allies in their
endeavour to create attractive conditions for
state banks and thus to keep national banking in
check. The Federal Reserve Banks, for their
part, contribute to this effort by offering state-
chartered banks membership in the Federal
Reserve System and thus high quality and
efficient supervision. The Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston, for example, points out that
“the Federal Reserve’s local supervision model
is closely aligned with the state banking model,
and is supportive of the dual banking system.”
Furthermore, the efficiency argument is put
forward as follows: “In the case of a state
member bank owned by a bank holding
company, the Federal Reserve directly
supervises both institutions, promoting a
consistent supervisory approach for the entire
organization.”95
While the dual banking system has been
criticised for creating a “redundant and
conflicting”96 regulatory structure and “being
duplicative and never easy to explain”97, it may
be credited for exerting a favourable influence
on regulatory/supervisory competition in the
US.98 On the side of – both state and federal –
supervisors and policy-makers there is
continuing support for the dual banking
system. The state bank supervisors claim that a
separate system of state banks “allows the
states to serve as laboratories for innovation
and change, not only in banking powers and
structures, but also in the area of consumer
protection”.99 According to the Comptroller of
the Currency “the national banking system is
the venue for testing and evaluating the
efficiencies and benefits that flow from
uniform national standards […]. In other words,
the national banking system is a laboratory too,
but what it demonstrates is the value of
91 In the case of national banks, the Fed and the FDIC only
receive the examination reports from the OCC.
92 See Eager R. C. and Muckenfuss C. F. (2003), p. 30.
93 Accreditation is done on a voluntary basis. The accreditation
program started in 1984 with the state banking department
of Illinois. Currently, 45 departments out of 54 CSBS
members (i.e. the fifty states plus Washington D.C. and the
“unincorporated organized territories” of Guam, Puerto
Rico and the Virgin Islands) are accredited. The confidential
accreditation procedure is based on an independent
assessment of the fulfilment of CSBS examination standards
by a panel of retired state and federal regulators. A review of
the accreditation is undertaken every five years.
94 With the creation of the FDIC, state banking agencies lost
their position as sole regulators of state non-member banks.
Moreover, in the Banking Act of 1935, there was even a
requirement for insured state non-member banks to join the
Federal Reserve System, a requirement that was removed
under the pressure from state agencies and non-member
banks in 1939. See Spong (2000), p. 24.
95 The Reserve Bank further stresses that it demands no
examination fees. See Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,
“Federal Reserve Membership for a State-chartered Bank”,
on the Internet.
96 Hammond, B. (1970), “Sovereignty and an Empty Purse:
Banks and Politics in the Civil War”, p. 349-50 cited in
Broome (2002), p. 220.
97 White (1999), p. 2.
98 Empirical research points, in particular, to regulatory
specialisation, “ … allowing banks to move to a better risk-
return trade-off by switching regulators when they are
switching business strategy”, see Rosen (2001), p. 19.
99 Testimony of J. A. Smith, Jr., North Carolina Commissioner
of Banks, on behalf of the Conference of State Bank
Supervisors, before the House Committee on Financial
Services, June 4 2003.26
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 35
September 2005
applying uniform national standards to
activities and products that, today, have
national markets.”100
The Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, A. Greenspan, argued
that “when there is no choice of regulatory
agency, rigid policies and interfering regulatory
micro-management can develop.”101 “A single
regulator, charged with responsibility for safety
and soundness, is likely to have a tendency to
suppress risk taking. A system of multiple
supervisors and regulators creates checks on this
propensity.”102 It has also been pointed out that
regulatory competition and even “messiness” is
not always bad, and could lead to unexpected
dynamism.103/104
As regulatory agencies are keen to avoid any
discrimination against the intermediaries under
their jurisdiction, they try to bring Congress on
their side when federal legislation puts their
interests at risk. A good example is the
amendment which – under the influence of the
state regulators – was passed in 1997 to the
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act of 1994. The amended statute
states that interstate branches of a state bank are
subject to the laws of the host state only to the
extent that an interstate branch of a national bank
in that host state is subject to host state law.
Otherwise, home state law applies. In this
specific context, it was the Conference of State
Bank Supervisors (CSBS) which provided
leadership in an effort to provide state banks with
legal parity in a federal law (thereby creating
“competitive equality”). Before the amendment,
Riegle-Neal provided that all  host state law
would apply to state bank branches, while only
part would apply to national banks. Interestingly,
up to 1994, state banking officials called for the
possibility to apply different rules to national
and state banks in order to allow them to apply
host rules to banks incorporated under another
state’s charter. 105 Only when they became aware
that this would mean a competitive disadvantage
for their “clients” – possibly driving them away
from their state charter to the national charter –
did they change their position.
While there is considerable competition
between agencies in attracting banks to register
under their jurisdiction106, this competition is
kept in check by the federal power to regulate.
This means that states are unlikely to exaggerate
in granting state banks an overly favourable
regulatory framework or to impose restrictive
state legislation on national banks since the
federal legislator/regulator could simply
legislate/regulate against such action. In other
words, regulatory competition in the US is
constrained by the supremacy of federal law,
which ultimately determines the leeway of
financial institutions in exercising their
activities. Given the existence of federal deposit
insurance and interstate banking and branching,
the federal level has a natural interest in
assuming responsibility for the safety and
soundness of depository institutions.107 If it were
not to assume this responsibility, a sub-optimal
situation could arise, whereby state regulators
100 See Comptroller of the Currency (2003), p. 10.
101 See BNA Banking Report, March 7 1994.
102 See Greenspan, “No Single Regulator for Banks”, Wall
Street Journal, December 15 1993.
103 See Walter I. (2003), p. 42.
104 Regulatory competition in the US is fostered also in terms
of enforcement, as can be seen by the role of New York’s
attorney general, Eliot Spitzer, in the context of the 2001/
2002 proceedings against major investment banks in New
York over the integrity of their investment advice. In his
view, the SEC had initially failed to act, justifying his
stepping into the breach. While Spitzer’s action was
criticised by the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee
(SFRC), which wants the securities markets in its essential
aspects to be regulated exclusively by federal authority, it
has been contributing to more vigilance on the side of the
SEC. See SFRC, “State and Federal Securities Market
Regulation”, Statement Nr. 186, www.aei.org/publications.
105 See Eager/Muckenfuss (2003), pp. 4 and 16.
106 “   …  As US bank regulatory agencies vie for control, they
have tried to bolster their relative position by offering new
powers to banks that choose them as the banks’ primary
regulator (through the bank’s choice of charter and holding
company structure)”, see Calomiris (2000), p. xvi.
107 With the FDICIA of 1991 and its system of capital-based
prompt corrective action, a core component of safety and
soundness regulations has been established, whereby the
federal banking agencies must establish minimum capital
levels. They are the yardstick for judging if an institution is
well-capitalised, adequately capitalised, undercapitalised,
significantly undercapitalised or critically undercapitalised.
Based on this, the federal regulator can take corrective
action (e.g. requiring recapitalisation). See Macey/Miller/
Carnell (2001), pp. 309ff. Furthermore, under the FDICIA,
the FDIC has the authority to prevent state banks from taking
on any broader powers that would put the deposit insurance
fund at risk. See Spong (2000), p. 40.27
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succumb to the incentive to offer regulatory
relief to state-chartered institutions in an
increasingly competitive environment.
What nowadays stands out in the US is not only
“controlled” regulatory competition between
state and federal levels but also competition
between supervisory agencies offering high-
quality supervision at a reasonable cost. In this
respect, state agencies together with the FDIC
or the Fed on the one hand and the OCC on the
other hand have an incentive to be efficient,
given the freedom for banks to switch charter at
low cost. In this context, the state agencies, the
FDIC and the Fed need to compensate for the
advantage the OCC has in being able to use its
pre-emptive powers to simplify operations of
nation-wide active banks. With regard to the
supervision of state banks, the Fed and the
FDIC compete for being their primary federal
regulator. While, in this context, banks have
access to central bank liquidity irrespective of
their federal regulator, being a member of one
of the Federal Reserve Banks is still considered
as a “reputational” asset.
8 STREAMLINING OF SUPERVISION IN THE
US: A DIFFICULT EXERCISE
Given its complex structure, the US regulatory/
supervisory system has been criticised for
creating regulatory overlaps and gaps and for
weakening accountability. Moreover, in the case
of the Fed, it has been argued that a conflict of
interest could emerge because of its dual
responsibility for monetary policy and financial
supervision. More recently, in a report to
Congress, the US Government Accountability
Office (GAO) noted that although the regulatory
system had been generally successful,  it lacked
overall direction and – despite the GLBA – did
not facilitate the oversight of large, complex
firms.108
To date, efforts to streamline the system
have concentrated on the federal level and
the four federal banking agencies (OCC, OTS,
Fed, FDIC).109 However, numerous efforts to
consolidate the banking supervisory structure110,
even those with significant political backing,
have so far failed.
In 1984 the Task Group on the Regulation of
Financial Services, chaired by the then Vice
President Bush, recommended to Congress that a
Federal Banking Agency be created into which
the OCC would be absorbed, while the
regulatory role of the Fed and the FDIC would be
substantially reduced. The Fed would have
continued to play a role only with respect to
the largest bank holding companies and the
FDIC would have concentrated on its role as
insurer. The Task Group’s recommendations
were not received well by Congress which
criticised, inter alia, the “ … politically motivated
attempts to decrease the [Fed’s] regulatory
independence … ”111
In 1994 the Clinton administration made a
similar proposal to that of the Task Group,
which also failed to win congressional approval.
While it was universally acknowledged that the
system needed reform, views differed on
whether a single Federal Banking Commission,
as suggested by the Administration (and
supported by OCC and OTS),112 would need to be
108 The GAO inter alia put forward the idea of having a single
regulatory entity for all systemically relevant financial
services firms. This entity could be an existing regulator or
a new one. The GAO acknowledged, however, that it could
be difficult to maintain an appropriate balance between the
interests of the large firms and of the smaller, more
specialised firms. See GAO (2004), p. 23.
109 The possible integration of the federal securities
supervisors (SEC/CFTC) and federal banking agencies into
one single entity was never seriously considered by
Congress.
110 A recent study by the FDIC describes 24 major proposals
that have been put forward as from the 1930s. See
Kushmeider (2004), pp. 65–74.
111 See Malloy (2002), p. 182f.
112 Interestingly, in 1991 the Department of the Treasury
argued that a multiplicity of regulators brings a broader
perspective to financial services regulation: “The existence
of fewer agencies would concentrate regulatory power in
the remaining ones, raising the danger of arbitrary or
inflexible behaviour … Agency pluralism, on the other hand,
may be useful, since it can bring to bear on general bank
supervision the different perspectives and experiences of
each regulator, and it subjects each one, where consultation
and coordination are required to the checks and balances
of the others opinion”. See US Department of the
Treasury, Modernizing the Financial System, February
1991, page XIX-6.28
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created. Alternatively, only the OCC and the
OTS would be merged into the new institution
(which would also take over the regulatory
function of the FDIC, leaving the Fed as the
second federal banking regulator). The latter
approach was suggested by Chairman
Greenspan, who explained to Congress that the
government’s proposal would, among other
things, lead to an end of the dual banking system,
because the FBC, having responsibility both for
national and state banks, would be biased in
favour of national banks. Furthermore,
Greenspan put forward arguments in favour of
the continued direct involvement of the Fed in
supervision, such as bringing in the macro-
economic perspective and a more positive
attitude towards risk-taking or having more
“clout” in crisis management. The Fed would
thereby make a better contribution to the long-
term health of the American economy than
would a “monolithic” risk-averse supervisor
outside the central bank. Reducing the number of
federal supervisors from four to two would bring
more than proportionate gains in efficiency,
although further reducing it to one would
compromise other public policy goals.
The need for a direct regulatory role of the Fed
was questioned by quite a number of experts
during the congressional hearing, some of them
accused the Fed of only defending regulatory
turf. Others, however, explicitly spoke out in
favour of the continued direct supervisory role
of the Fed. The latter stressed in particular the
need to preserve the “creativity” of the dual
banking system. In the end, the government’s
calls for quick action to modernise the
supervisory structure were less convincing to
Congress than the risk of changing established
structural features of the US financial system
(dual banking system, regulatory role of the
Fed). The Fed was seen as an ally in the defence
of the interests of the state banks against their
national bank competitors, although the
government tried hard to convince Congress
that the dual banking system was not at risk by
pointing, inter alia, to the fact that the OTS
supervised both federal and state thrifts.
After the renewed failure to reform banking
supervision, Congress turned its attention to
the repeal of the McFadden-Act, which
prohibited interstate branching, and the
discussion surrounding the reform/repeal of
Glass-Steagall. Even after the passage of the
GLBA, the issue of reforming the regulatory
agencies did not forcefully re-emerge. This
was, however, hardly surprising. Following the
increasing of the powers of the Fed by
Congress and in view of the appreciation by
politicians and business of the dual banking
system, it would have been difficult to imagine
a system that was not formed by at least two
federal banking regulators (one for national
banks, the OCC, and one for state banks, the
Fed or the FDIC). More generally, the
widespread mistrust among US citizens of
excessive concentration of power also played a
role. Finally, the complaints from the banking
industry concerning the multiplicity of
regulators in the US remained subdued, since
market participants seemed to appreciate the
choice entailed in the system.
9 CONCLUSIONS
While some describe the US financial system
as evolutionary in nature, others consider it to
be a “patchwork” or as having been “crisis-
built”. If one had to build the regulatory
structure again from scratch, it would probably
look quite different from how it looks today.
More critical observers argue that having four
federal banking regulators that have arisen in
response to specific historical circumstances,
makes regulation potentially more complicated
and less expeditious than it needs to be. Also,
the multiplicity of regulators is seen as
constituting a risk of leniency vis-à-vis the
supervised entities as well as of causing
confusion and opaqueness for the consumer.
Furthermore, doubts have been expressed as to
whether the increasing inter-linkages between
banking, insurance and the securities markets
are adequately taken into account by the
institutional set-up. An institutionally more
integrated regulatory/supervisory approach is29
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9 CONCLUSIONS
considered by many as a better solution to the
current structure.
The specific institutional framework of
regulation/supervision in the US as it has
emerged over time also contains, however, a
number of attractive features. It allows for
regulatory competition under a system of
checks and balances, facilitates the
achievement of uniform conditions for cross-
border financial activity and potentially
provides for flexibility to adapt to changing
market conditions.
Elements of regulatory competition are
introduced into the system, inter alia, by the
fact that banks can choose between a state and a
national charter. Moreover, state banks – with
regard to their federal supervisor – can opt
either for direct supervision by the FDIC or by
the Fed. The regulatory competition introduced
by these elements of choice is, however, not
unrestricted. Indeed, while Congress has
delegated regulatory powers to specialised
agencies, it can at any point intervene in the
process and regulate itself. Likewise, Congress
can overrule any state legislation. In particular,
these checks and balances (delegation of
powers to agencies, state competences and
federal level prerogatives) make the US
regulatory/supervisory system attractive in
various respects both from a market and
regulatory point of view.
– First, the potential threat of losing regulated
entities to “competing” regulators is a
powerful incentive for regulators to avoid
overregulation and to be responsive to the
specific needs of regulated institutions and
evolving markets. In this way, risk-taking
and innovation are encouraged in the
financial system.
– Second, the greater closeness to the market
need not come at the expense of the quality
of regulation and supervision. In fact, the
risk of a race to the bottom is constrained by
the above-mentioned power of Congress to
legislate at any time against state laws and/
or to withdraw rule-making authority from
regulatory agencies.
The possibility for the federal level to
intervene is not only crucial in areas where
Congress traditionally fulfils a legislative
role, such as banking, but also in areas where
there is no federal legislation, but instead a
free choice of state law and mutual
recognition, such as in US corporate law. In
this case, the “intervention capacity” of the
federal level provides a powerful incentive
for states to provide appropriate regulation.
Similarly, state regulation of the insurance
business, for example, has to constantly
prove its appropriateness given increasing
economic integration. Consequently, state
insurance commissioners strive to co-
operate effectively under the threat of the
introduction of federal regulation or of an
optional federal insurance charter.
– Third, the prerogatives of the federal level in
the US and the availability of a “national
charter” support the creation of uniform
legal conditions for banks with cross-border
activities. In the US, federal authorities may
remove barriers for cross-border activities
without the need to involve the individual
states in decision-making. Thus, the OCC’s
pre-emptive power benefits national banks
encountering obstacles arising, for example,
from state consumer laws.
– Fourth, the system allows for the flexible
adaptation of financial regulation to market
conditions. This is mainly due to the fact that
the degree of direct involvement of political
authorities in rule-making is comparatively
low. Rule-making by regulatory agencies in
the US encompasses rules which in the EU
would be considered – at least in part – as
framework legislation to be passed by the
Council and the EP (e.g. the new capital
requirements in response to Basel II).
The risk that the number of agencies
involved in rule-making could affect the
speed with which harmonised financial rules30
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are adopted and changed is again kept in
check by the congressional power to
regulate directly. It constitutes an incentive
for agencies to agree to harmonised rules
without undue delay.
The flexibility to change the financial
framework in the US also affects the
institutional structure. From a legal point of
view, Congress could merge or abolish
regulatory agencies, or create completely
new ones at its discretion. However, in
practical terms, a fundamental redesign of
institutional structures is difficult to achieve
while credible institutions (e.g. the Fed)
oppose such changes. So far, the numerous
attempts to streamline the regulatory
structure in the US have failed. However,
Congress authorised the Fed to act as an
umbrella supervisor over financial holding
companies as a necessary corollary to the
formation of financial conglomerates
allowed under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act.
Overall, the US regulatory framework can be
described as a system of controlled regulatory
competition, with Congress exercising an
oversight role while retaining ultimate
authority. With regard to the EU, it should be
noted that minimum harmonisation and mutual
recognition, if properly applied, provide room
for regulatory competition among Member
States. In the EU context, regulatory
competition may be regarded as a potential
force for achieving a level playing field on the
financial market. However, since mutual
recognition does not work in a satisfactory
way, it may take some time to achieve such a
legal level playing field.113
Moreover, the role of the EU decision-making
bodies in financial markets regulation – the
Council and the EP –  is different from that of
Congress. As there are no US-style regulatory
agencies in the EU,114 the Council and the EP
continue to be more involved in detailed
legislation than Congress.
With the Lamfalussy process, the EU has
embarked on a strategy to speed up financial
market regulation, make it more adaptable to
changing market trends and to provide for a
level-playing field through convergent
implementation. This strategy undoubtedly
goes in the right direction and seems to fit the
specific “constitutional order” of the EU.
Despite this progress, some of the above-
mentioned features of the US model, such as
the prominent role of regulatory agencies,
controlled regulatory competition and the
federal power to create uniform conditions may
provide inspiration for further improvement of
the institutional structures in the EU. It should,
however, be noted that implementation of these
elements may require the EU to become more
similar to the US as a political entity, which is a
fully-fledged federal state, where the federal
level operates largely independently from the
state level. In the EU, Member States can be
expected to continue to play a dominant role in
shaping EU policies, even if ratification of the
Constitutional Treaty would bring about a
further strengthening of the European
Parliament.
113 Recently, elements of regulatory competition have been
reinforced. In the field of securities, for example, issuers of
debt securities may – under certain conditions – have their
prospectus approved by an EU securities regulator other
than the one of the home country. Regulatory competition
may also increase as companies may opt for the European
Company Statute and as their mobility will be facilitated by
the forthcoming EU directives on cross-border mergers and
cross-border transfer of registered offices.
114 According to the prevailing school of thought (i.e. the so-
called Meroni doctrine), the establishment of US-style
regulatory agencies would require an explicit authorisation
by the Treaty. Thus, the Council and/or the EP would only
be able to create such agencies if the current Treaty (and
also the future Constitutional Treaty) were amended
empowering them to do so. Another option, already
available in Art. 105/6 of the Treaty, would be to entrust the
ECB with “specific tasks concerning policies relating to the
prudential supervision of credit institutions and other
financial institutions with the exception of insurance
undertakings.” However, any such transfer would, by
nature, be of limited scope. Moreover, it would need to be
agreed upon in the Council by unanimity.31
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1) Excludes foreign banking organisations and bank/financial holding companies.32
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 35
September 2005
115 Based on Inter-Institutional Monitoring Group (2004),
p. 49.
116 Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS),
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR),
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS).
117 European Banking Committee (EBC), European Securities
Committee (ESC), European Insurance & Occupational
Pensions Committee (EIOPC), European Financial
Conglomerates Committee (EFCC).
ANNEX II
THE FOUR LEVELS OF THE LAMFALUSSY
PROCESS115
LEVEL I
Community legislation adopted by the Council
and the European Parliament, upon a proposal
by the European Commission under the co-
decision procedure: legislation should be based
only on framework principles and definition of
implementing powers for the Commission.
LEVEL II
Community legislation adopted by the
Commission to lay down the technical details
for the principles agreed at “Level I” under the
so-called comitology procedure. Particular
features:
– Technical advice prepared by the Level III-
committees (CEBS, CESR, CEIOPS)116,
following mandates issued by the
Commission and based on consultation with
market users;
– Favourable vote of Member States
(qualified majority) as represented in the
Level II-committees (EBC, ESC, EIOPC,
EFCC);117
– European Parliament may adopt resolutions
a) within three months of the draft
implementing measure; b) within one month
of the vote of the Level II-committees if
Level II-measures go beyond implementing
powers.
LEVEL III
Level III-committees (CEBS, CESR, CEIOPS)
in which the national supervisory authorities
are represented, to facilitate consistent day-to-
day implementation of Community law. They
may issue guidelines and common, but non-
binding, standards.
LEVEL IV
Commission checks compliance of Member
State laws with EU legislation. If necessary, it
takes legal action against Member States
before the Court of Justice.33
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ANNEX IV
TOP 50 US BANKS (TOTAL ASSETS IN BN USD AND PRIMARY FEDERAL SUPERVISORS1)
Table
1) As of 30 September 2004; the top 50 banks represent about 70% of all commercial banks’ assets.
The table has been updated with regard to JP Morgan Chase which is in the process of changing to the national charter.
OCC Federal Reserve System FDIC
1 Bank of America, Charlotte 740
2 JP Morgan Chase 661
3 Citibank 651
4 Wachovia Bank 380
5 Wells Fargo Bank 362
6 Bank One, Chicago 259
7 Fleet National Bank 209
8 U.S. Bank 192
9 Suntrust Bank 126
10 HSBC Bank 118
11 State Street and Trust Company 96
12 Bank of New York 90
13 Keybank 77
14 Branch Banking and Trust Company 73
15 PNC Bank 71
16 Merrill Lynch 69
17 Bank One, Columbus 69
18 Lasalle Bank 61
19 Fifth Third Bank, Cincinnati 60
20 MBNA America Bank 58
21 Citibank (South Dakota) 54
22 Chase Manhattan Bank USA 54
23 Southtrust Bank 53
24 Comerica Bank 52
25 Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company 52
26 National City Bank 51
27 Charter One Bank 50
28 Amsouth Bank 49
29 Regions Bank 46
30 Union Bank of California 46
31 Standard Federal Bank 41
32 Bank of Amercia, Phoenix 41
33 National City Bank of Indiana 39
34 Fifth Third Bank, Grand Rapids 38
35 Wells Fargo Bank 38
36 Union Planters Bank 34
37 Treasury Bank 33
38 M&I Marshall & Ilsley Bank 33
39 Northern Trust Company 33
40 Deutsche Bank Trust 32
41 Bank One, Delaware 31
42 Bank of the West 31
43 Huntington National Bank 31
44 Citizens Bank of Massachusetts 30
45 Banknorth 28
46 Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania 28
47 Washington Mutual Bank 28
48 First Tennessee Bank 28
49 Compass Bank 27
50 Capital One Bank 27
Total 4,497 852 23135
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